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U.S. FOREIGN TRADE AND THE
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, 1800-1913
ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the main developments in U.S. trade and the balance of payments from
the first years of the 19th century to the first decade of the 20th.
American export trade was dominated by agricultural and other resource products long
after the majority of the labor force had shifted out of agriculture. The shift out of agriculture
was more rapid among the major trading partners of the United States because the American land
area increased in the first half of the nineteenth century and agricultural land increased
throughout the century. The rise in agricultural land area and a rapid decline in transport cost
increased the supply of U.S. agricultural products to Europe and further displaced European
agriculture and encouraged migration from Europe.
The existence of the large world market, relatively open to the products of American
comparative advantage and with a high price elasticity of demand for American exports,
encouraged the expansion of U.S. land, agriculture, capital inflows, immigration, and the western
migration of population.
Robert E. Lipsey




U.S. TRADE AROUND 1800
Trade was on the minds of the entrepreneurs who financed the first
settlements in the Americas. They dreamt of riches --thekind that could
come only from exploiting the natural resources of areas newly opened to
European settlement and exporting the products. They did not envisage
financing subsistence farmers or artisans, or manufacturing settlements
serving local markets.
As it turned out, the American colonies were, in their early days,
heavily involved in exporting. They probably exported something like a
quarter of their production in the early years of the 18th Century (Gallman
and Lipsey, in Davis, Easterlin, and Parker, 1972). By the end of the 18th
Century that export propensity had been cut in half. Thus, around 1800,
something like ten to fifteen per cent of U.S. output was exported (j.j and
Shepherd and Walton 1972, p. 44). To some extent, that decline in the export
propensity could be attributed simply to population growth -- largercountries
tend to trade less in proportion to their output than smaller countries -- but
the decline in exporting was too large for much of it to be attributed to that
cause.
Exports of domestic merchandise by the United States at the beginning of
the 19th century were about 3 per cent of world exports and five per cent of
Europe's exports at a time when the population of the United States was only
about 1/2 of 1 per cent of the world's population and 2 1/2 per cent of
Europe's (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975 and Bairoch, 1976a, Table 2, p. 18).
Thus in terms of exports of its own products per capita, excluding re-exports
of products made by others, the United States was twice as trade-oriented as
Europe, and more than five times as export-oriented as the world as a whole.2
The United States was also heavily engaged as an intermediary in a variety of
indirect "triangular" trades, especially with the nearby European colonies.
If we measured the trade propensity by total exports, including re-exports,
the U.S. ratios would be about twice as high.
American exports in the early l800s were almost all natural resource
products. More than three quarters were the output of agriculture in 1803-07
and almost another fifth the output of forests and of the sea. Less than 5
per cent was the product of manufacturing industries (U.S. Congress, 1884,
Table 3). The industry origin of American exports in these years was similar
to that of 35 years earlier.
This almost total concentration of exports on natural resource products
at the beginning of the 19th Century, and the fact that it almost duplicated
the export trade pattern of the mid-18th Century. contrasts with indications
that the structure of production had already started to shift away from
primary products. If Bairoch's (1982) very rough estimates are to be believed,
the United States (or the area that was to become the United States) moved
from a level of per capita industrial output far below the world level, and
that of even China and India, in 1750, to a level above the average of
developed countries and of Europe as a whole around 1800, behind only the UK,
by a large margin, and Belgium and Switzerland by narrow margins. Thus, the
structure of production seemed to be changing faster than that of other
countries without altering the comparative advantage of the United States.
Most of the exports from the United States were destined for Europe
(over 60 per cent), about a quarter to Great Britain and Ireland. Those
shares represented a considerable decline from the period around 1770 (over 70
per cent to Europe, 57 per cent to Great Britain and Northern Ireland alone).3
Almost all the exports not bound for Europe were destined for the West Indies
(29 per cent in 1768-72). New England's exports were largely to the West
Indies, as were half the exports of the middle colonies, while exports from
the southern colonies, the producers of cotton and tobacco, went over-
whelmingly to Great Britain. The southern colonies dominated exports to Great
Britain in 1768-72 (almost 90 per cent), the middle colonies, exports to
Southern Europe (over half), and New England and the middle colonies, exports
to the West Indies (three quarters) (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, and
Shepherd and Walton, 1972, pp. 94-95).
The southern colonies were the most dependent on exporting before the
American Revolution. Their exports per capita were roughly twice as high as
those of New England and the middle colonies. Imports per capita were much
more similar among the regions, almost identical between New England and the
Middle Colonies on the one hand, and the southern colonies on the other
(Shepherd and Walton, p. 113).
A distinctive feature of U.S. trade at the turn of the century was the
exceptionally high share of re-exports in total exports. Over half of exports
consisted of re-exports, as opposed to exports of U.S. merchandise, in almost
every year from 1796 through 1808, until the embargo (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1975, Series 190-192).
This enormous re-exporting activity was a consequence of the European Wars
following the early l790s, in which Great Britain and France each attempted to
block the other's trade with its colonies. The effect "...wasto throw into
our hands the greater part of the colonial carrying trade of the world -an
economic prize for which European nations had been fiercely struggling for
nearly two centuries" (Callender, Introduction to Chapter VI)." The valuable4
articles of colonial produce, such as sugar, coffee, spirits, cocoa, indigo,
pepper, and spices of all kind, were carried by them, either directly to
Europe, or brought to the United States, and from thence exported in American
vessels. ...Themanufactures of Europe, and particularly those of Great
Britain, as well as the manufactures and produce of the East Indies and China,
were, also, imported, and again exported in large quantities, to the West
Indies, South America and elsewhere. (Pitkin, as quoted in Callender, pp. 240-
241).
The United States not only accounted for a disproportionate share of
merchandise trade but also was heavily involved in the export of shipping
services. Earnings on ocean freight were about 30 per cent of export earnings
during the five years around 1800. The revenue from shipping was larger than
from exports of any commodity.
Imports of merchandise almost always exceeded exports at the beginning
of the nineteenth century. The negative trade balance was more than offset by
large freight earnings, but the U.S. had negative net balances on account of
other services, such as insurance and interest. The interest item reflected
the accumulated net current account deficit of earlier years, although during
the quinquennium around 1800, there was a small net outflow of capital from
the U.S. (North, 1960).
Wilkins (1989) estimated that America's long-term foreign obligations in
1803 were $65.70 million or more. These included foreign holdings of federal
debt (almost $5 million) plus over $15 million in holdings of corporate stock,
particularly stock in the Bank of the United States (pp. 48 and 646). If
Wilkins is correct that North had underestimated the foreign debt of the
United States, the estimates of interest payments and the current account
deficit mentioned above are also too low.S
THE GROWTHOFTOTALU.S.TRADE
TheU.S. share of world trade
As the 19th century began, U.S. trade was a minor part of world trade.
Overthecourse of the century, that part grew, until in 1900 U.S. exports
were 15 per cent of world exports (Table 1). Some of that increase simply
reflected the growth of the U.S. population from about a half per cent of that
of the world in 1800 to around 5 per cent in 1900 and 1910.
The share of American domestic exports in the total of world export
trade was far above the U.S. population share and probably well above the U.S.
share in world output throughout the 19th Century. In other words, the U.S.
was more export-oriented than the average country. The export
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series Ul91,
Bairoch (1976a), p. 18, and Maddison (1962).
share relative to the world rose throughout the 19th Century and then receded
a bit before World War I.
The disparity between the U.S. world export share and its population
share was steadily reduced over the 110 years. Relative to Europe, the
disparity was much smaller, but it, too, fell through the 19th Century, until
it disappeared in 1910, with the U.S. at about 20 per cent of Europe's exports6
and population. Thus by that time there was no difference from Europe with
respect to the degree of orientation toward exports.
The comparison of U.S. trade with world trade can be made also for total
trade measured by the sum of exports and imports (Table 2). Since U.S.
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U.S. domestic exports plus imports for consumption
(imports passing through customs directly from abroad
plus imports passing through customs from bond).
For years when imports for consumption are not available,
we use general imports minus exports of foreign merchandise
(re-exports) as a substitute, assuming no change in inven-
tories in bond.
Source: Rostow (1978), Table B-i, with data in £ multi-
plied by 4.495, and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U191
through U194.
imports were not rising as fast as U.S. exports, as the U.S. reduced its
foreign borrowing relative to its trade, the combined share levelled off
earlier, before the end of the century. At its peak, the U.S. trade share was
something around twice the U.S. share of the world's population.
Whatever the measure used, the trend of U.S. trade during the 19th
century was one of increasing importance in the world market, particularly for
U.S. exports. That growth in importance in trade reflected in large part the7
rising size of the U.S. in terms of population and production, particularly
the latter as U.S. growth in output per capita outpaced that of the rest of
the world.
Total Trade and Output
The proportion of U.S. output that was destined for foreign markets went
through some wide annual swings before the European peace settlement in 1815.
However, aside from a few years of embargo and war, the main trend in the
ratio of exports to aggregate U.S. output in current prices was a decline from
the 10-15 per cent of the 1790s and the much higher levels of the end of the
colonial period (Table 3). For the 100 years following the Napoleonic Wars
the average decade ratios ranged only from about 5 1/2 to 7 per cent. The
lowest export proportions were around 1830 and in the 1850s and the highest.
after the early period, were in the 20 years after 1890. The ratios for 1793
to 1860 are lower than those of the colonial period not only because trade
declined in importance but also because these national output measures in the
denominator include more non-market output -farmimprovements and home
manufacturing -thanearlier and later output measures. By their nature,
these forms of output are not likely to be exported. They declined from 15-20
percent to 7 or 8 per cent of conventionally measured output between 1800 and
1860. Thus a conventional output measure would show some continued decline in
the trade share in the early 1800s.
The ratio of exports to GNP in constant dollars tells something of the8
Table 3
U.S. Merchandise Exports and Imports as Percent of CNP
Current Dollars 1860 Prices
ExportsImports Exports Imports
Early Years
1770 15-20 NA NA NA
1790-1800 10-15 15-20 NA NA
17931860a
1793 NA NA 9.0
1800 6.8 8.4 6.0 6.4
1810 4.9 5.6 6.1 4.5
1820 6.3 8.0 4.5 4.6
1830 5.3 6.1 5.4 4.9
1840 5.9 6.1 6.0 5.8
1850 5.8 6.6 6.3 7.5
1860 6.3 6.7 6.1 6.7
18341913b
1834-1843 6.2 6.7 6.3 6.4
1839-1848 5.9 5.8 6.7 5.8
1849-1858 5.6 6.6 6.3 7.7
1869-1878 6.2 6.3 6.8 7.0
1879-1888 6.7 5.7 5.7 5.8
1889-1898 6.9 5.7 6.5 5.6
1899-1908 6.8 4.5 6.4 5.0
1899-1908 6.7 4.6 5.2 4.0
1904-1913 6.3 4.7 4.8 4.3
aGDp data are the "broad concept" from Weiss. Trade data are 5-year
averages around the reported year, except for 1810, which is a 3-year
average, 1809-1811, and 1860, which is a 3-year average, 1858-1860.
bGallman GNP data, 1834-1908, and Kuznets CNP data,1899-1.913.
CNP estimates from Rower (1989) and Gordon (1989) do not alter these trends
substantially.
Sources: Trade data are from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U19l,
192, 193, and 194, and Lipsey (1972). Data are for exports of domestic
merchandise and imports for consumption. For 1790-1820 imports for
consumption are estimated as general imports minus reexports. National output
data are from Galiman (1966), Lipsey (1963), for Kuznets data, and Weiss
(1992) and (1993).9
same story of lower dependence on export markets in the 19th century than
earlier. In any case, the greatest dependence on export markets for the U.S.
economy as a whole had ended before the 19th century began, and certainly
before the l820s.
The U.S. dependence on import trade was even greater than on export
trade in the period around 1770, perhaps a third of the colonies' production
or consumption. During the first half of the 19th century the import ratio
was above the export ratio, especially in the early years, but imports fell
below exports after the 1870s as the U.S. turned from capital importer to
capital exporter.
In real terms, imports fell even more than exports relative to the GNP,
but they followed the same path of decline to 1829-38 and then a recovery.
The highest dependence on imports, in real terms, was just before the Civil
War, after which the ratio fell by about a third.
One way to interpret the trade/output ratios is to think of growth in
trade that is no faster than growth in output as representing Npassive trade
behavior. Growth in trade more rapid than that in output, leading to a rise
in the trade/output ratio, can be thought of as "activeTM or even "aggressive"
trade behavior. Most of the period appears to be characterized by passive
trade behavior in this sense, but there was a fairly long stretch of years,
from the 1850s through the 1890s when American exporting became more
aggressive, and each decade saw some rise in the export ratio. However, no
such trend appears in the constant price series; the trend in the current
price ratios reflects a rise in export prices relative to domestic prices in
these decades.10
THE U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND CAPITAL FLOWS
For most of the period from the inauguration of George Washington to the
end of the 19th Century, the United States imported more merchandise than it
exported. Only in the last three decades of the century did exports exceed
imports, and that export surplus continued into the 20th Century (Table 4).
Table 4
Balance of Merchandise Trade and International Freight,
and Interest Payments of the United States
(Annual Averages: millions of dollars)
Merchandise Freight Interest
1790-1798 -11.1 13.3 -4.7
1799-1808 -18.8 27.9 -4.8
1809-1818 -21.2 21.2 -4.9
1819-1828 -5.7 10.0 -5.0
1829-1838 -20.8 8.2 -6.5
1839-1848 -1.9 11.4 -9.5
1849-1858 -10.6 11.8 -16.3
1859-1868 -9.5 6.3 -38.8
1869-1878 52.7 2.7 -87.7
1879-1888 132.4 -6.0 -89.2
1889-1899 240.8 -8.0 -127.6
1900' 640. -7. -114.
754. -36. -99.
1901-1913 570.2 -39.2 -71.5
'Comparable with earlier years.
bcomparable with later years.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975),
Series U2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 13.
Until the Civil War, the deficit on merchandise trade was roughly offset
by a surplus on shipping earnings, as the U.S. merchant fleet earned much more
than the U.S. paid to foreigners for freight shipments. That source of income
dwindled during and after the Civil War, and by the l880s, the U.S. had become11
a net importer of shipping services.
Even while freight earnings were offsetting the deficit in the
merchandise trade account, the other main current account item, interest, was
always in deficit. The United States began its existence as a net debtor and
all through the 19th century and up to World War I it paid out more in
interest on its debts than it earned on its foreign assets.
The obverse of this excess of current account payments was the import of
capital into the United States. Until an abrupt turn to capital exporting at
the end of the century, the United States was a net borrower from foreign
countries throughout the 19th century (Table 5).
The cumulation of borrowing year after year meant that the United States
was a net debtor throughout these years. Even at the beginning of World War
I, despite fifteen or twenty years in which the United States was a net
foreign lender most of the time, the country was still a net debtor to the
rest of the world (Table 6).
Table 5
Net Flow of Capital to the United States















'Comparable with earlier years.
bComparable with later years.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series UlS-23.12
Table 6
Net Liabilities (-)ofthe United States, 1789-1914
(Unit:$million)
From Cumulation






















Notes to Table 6
aAfter defaults of $50 million in 1816-19
bAfter defaults of $12 million in 1841 and 1842
Sources: Lewis (1938), pp. 445 and 560; U.S. Bureau of the Census
(1975), Series U40, taken from North (1960) and Simon (1960),
extended by cumulating Series Ul8 to U23. Estimates by Wilkins
(1989), Tables 3.1 (pp. 50-52) and 5.4 (pp. 147-150) suggest
somewhat larger net liabilities in 1803, by perhaps $15
million, and in 1914 by about $340 million.13
These figures on net U.S. liabilities say that foreigners had some net
claim on part of the wealth of the United States throughout the 19th Century.
That is, foreigners' claims on U.S. wealth were larger than U.S. claims on
foreign wealth. One comparison of foreign claims with reproducible wealth
suggests that the net foreign claims amounted to almost 14 per cent of wealth
at the beginning of the century. That share fell to about 7 per cent by 1850,
4 per cent by 1900, and only two per cent on the eve of World War I (Davis.
1972, Table 8.12). More recent calculations by Callman (1992) that raise the
estimated value of reproducible wealth, but put a rather low figure on foreign
claims in comparison to Lewis (1938) and Wilkins (1989), are summarized in
Table 7. They describe a fall in the foreign claims from 13 per cent of
domestic capital, excluding land, in 1774 to 9 per cent at the end of the 18th
century, and then some sharp fluctuations through the 19th century. These
reflect not only inflows and outflows of capital and the rate of U.S. capital
formation, but also the effects of U.S. inflation, which tended at times to
reduce the ratio by raising the nominal value of U.S. capl.tal.
There are several ways to view the role of these flows of financial
capital in American development. One is as a source of financing for
aggregate capital formation, permitting faster accumulation of capital than
would have taken place if only domestic financing had been available. On this
basis, it is hard to suppose that imports of capital had a great influence on
the rate of development during most of the nineteenth century. The capital
inflows or changes in net foreign obligations were rarely more than 6 percent
of gross capital formation or of changes in the domestic capital stock of the
United States (Table 8). The major exceptions were 1815 to 1840 and the
period including the Civil War, 1860 to 1870, when the main foreign investmentTable 7
Net Foreign Claims as Per Cent of Value of Domestic Capital














Source: Galiman (1992), Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4.
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Sources; Caliman (1992), Tables 2.1. 2.2, and2.4
Edelstein (1982), Table 10.1 cols. 1 and 3.16
was in federal government bonds. Edeistein has suggested that U.S. borrowing
from foreign countries rose when U.S. capital formation surged; borrowing
tapered off as U.S. saving, rising more gradually and steadily, caught up with
capital formation. Thus, investment from abroad accommodated the large spurts
in the demand for capital that characterized the rapidly growing economy.
There may have been other roles for borrowing from abroad. One might
have been to supply funds for particularly risky forms of capital formation at
a lower interest rate than would have been required by domestic lenders.
Another might have been to supply funds when, in the face of heavy demands by
rapidly growing sectors, U.S. domestic lenders' needs for diversification of
risks made them reluctant to offer sufficient financing to these sectors.
Another interpretation is that U.S. railway and government securities,
relatively safe and requiring less local knowledge than investment in smaller-
scale enterprises in agriculture, mining, and manufacturing, tended to be sold
overseas, while domestic suppliers of capital invested in the riskier, but
more profitable, sectors (Edelstein 1982, 237-38).
The bulk of foreign investment in the United States was portfolio
investment rather than direct investment. That is, it consisted of purchases
of bonds or, to a small extent, equities, that did not involve control over
the enterprise receiving the capital. Just before World War I, about 80
percent of the stock of long-term foreign investment in the United States was
portfolio investment; the same had been true for the flow over a long period
(Edeistein 1982, 36 and 37). Governments and railways were the chief
borrowers, and most of the financing was in the form of bonds rather than
equities.
In 1789, it was public debt that was the main channel for foreign17
capital, and Wilkins (1989, Table 2.1. P. 32), estimates that almost 30 per
cent was held abroad, mainly in France and Holland. That was clearly
infrastructure financing, since it supported the establishment of the United
States as an independent country. In 1803, foreigners also held a third of
corporate stock, mainly of banks (Wilkins, 1989, Table 2.3, p. 37). The
Louisiana Purchase in 1803 added about $11 million to the total federal debt
and the same amount to the federal debt held by foreigners, so that we can
particularly describe this important jump in the size of the U.S. economy as
having been financed from abroad.
Throughout the first half of the 19th Century, almost all foreign
financing went to governments, first the federal government and later, state
governments, and to banks (Wilkins, 1989, Table 3.1, Pp. 50-51). Only after
that did railroads become a major field for foreign capital, but federal
borrowing during the Civil War far exceeded the total of other borrowing
through the 1870s. We know more about British capital than about that of
other countries, but that is not a great handicap because the British role was
so large, over three-quarters of long-term foreign investment in the U.S. at
the end of the 19th century and still 60 percent in 1914 (Wilkins, 1989, Table
58, p. 159).
Most of the foreign investment, whether for government or private
companies, went to large, lumpy, social overhead capital projects, such as
canals, railways, electrical utilities, and telephone and telegraph systems
(Edelstein 1982, 39-41). Manufacturing enterprises were probably almost all
too small to seek foreign financing by floating stock or bond issues, or in
most cases, by any type of public financing, even from domestic sources.
There were many instances of manufacturing enterprises set up by foreign18
craftsmen or entrepreneurs with special knowledge or skills. However, in an
era in which transportation and communication were slow by modern standards,
these often involved the migration of the owners and eventual conversion of
their enterprises into domestic entities. Thus, these enterprises involved
mainly a flow of human capital to the United States.
After 1865, relatively little of the flow of new foreign financing went
into government securities. From 1865 through 1914, over 60 per cent of
British portfolio investment flowed into transportation, almost entirely
railroads. Manufacturing, utilities, mining, and finance and real estate each
accounted for 6 to 7 per cent, as did all levels of government (Wilkins, 1989,
Table 5-9, p. 164). In 1910, 85 per cent of British investment was in
railroads, according to one estimate.
The likelihood that foreign investment was much more important in the
flow of capital to the railroad sector than in U.S. fixed investment as a
whole is suggested by the fact that the value of foreign investment in U.S.
railroads in 1914 was about a quarter of the book value of railroad road and
equipment (Wilkins, 1989, Table 6.1, p. 194, and HS, Series Q356). British
investment alone was 16 per cent of the book value in 1914 (j).Foreign
holdings were estimated by Jenks to range from 20 per cent to a third of the
nominal value of U.S. railroad securities between 1873 and 1914 (Wilkins,
1989, Table 6.4, p. 198).
Since the United States was inferior to European countries in technology
in a number of industries during the 19th century, it may seem surprising that
there was so little inflow of direct investment, a natural channel for the
exploitation of technological advantages. Transportation and communication
were so slow, by modern standards, that it was almost impossible to control a19
subsidiary enterprise from across an ocean. Under those circumstances, the
transfer of technology and skills took somewhat different forms, particularly
the migration of key personnel, often children or other relatives, to
establish subsidiary enterprises or to manage them once they were acquired.
The enterprises were frequently what Mira Wilkins (1989) referred to as "free-
standing" enterprises, in the sense that while they were owned by foreigners,
they were not subsidiaries of foreign companies. Such enterprises were likely
over time to evolve into independent, domestic U.S. firms through the
migration of their owners to the United States and their adaptation to
American circumstances. In the end, the flow of financial capital was
intertwined with a flow of human capital.
Immigration is often thought of as a movement of labor, but it is also a
flow of human capital. Movements of human capital are not traditionally
included in balance of payments accounts, since no monetary payment is
involved, at least when there is no slavery. However, the flow of human
capital may have been more important to U.S. development than the flows of
financial capital. In terms of numbers, immigration into the United States in
each decade from the 1830s through the beginning of World War I ranged from
about 5 percent to 10 percent of the number already in the country (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1975, Series A 6, and C 89). Furthermore, most of the
immigrants (a 50 percent larger proportion than in the population as a whole)
were between fifteen and forty-four years of age (U.S. Bureau of the Census
1975, Series C 119, C 122-27, C 138, and C 141). They came to the United
States with most of their rearing costs already incurred in their home
countries and with a large part of their working lives still ahead of them.
Some notion of the relative importance of the human and financial20
capital flows is provided by Neal and Uselding (1972), who estimated the
"resource pool arising from net immigration." The two types of inward capital
flows are compared in Table 9.
Table 9
Cumulated Net Capital Inf low and Resources from Net Immigration
(Unit: millions of $1860)
Net Capital Inflow Immigration
1799-1860 56 198.5 -934.9
1860-1890 1,660 3,514.2 -6,609.0
Source: Callinan (1992) and Neal and Uselding (1972), Table V.
Even at the peak period of financial capital inflow, 1860-1890 (the United
States became a net exporter of capital after that), the low end of the range
for the estimate of the value of the human capital inflow embodied in
immigration was more than twice the financial capital flow. Before the Civil
War, the relative importance of the human capital flow was even greater, and
in the 1900-1909 decade, when the net financial capital flow was outward
rather than inward, the inflow of resources through immigration continued at a
high level. Thus the contribution of the inflow of resources from abroad to
American growth was much greater than might be inferred from the conventional
capital inflow data.21
CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF U.S. TRADE
AND THE COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE OF THE U.S.
The Composition of Trade
The composition of American exports in the late 18th century and the
beginning of the 19th century reflected the fact that American comparative
advantage was based on the exploitation of abundant natural resources. The
largest part of exports consisted of agricultural products, but products of
the forest and of the sea were also important: 19 per cent of the total in
1803-1810, already a large decline from the 28 per cent of British continental
colonies in 1770 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, Series z294). Thus, the
first great shift in export composition, as population moved away from the
coast and as forest land was cleared for farming, was, within resource
products, away from forest and ocean products toward those from agriculture.
In the decades before the Civil War around 80 per cent of U.S. exports were of
agricultural products.
An indication of the shifts in importance of the sectors from which
exports originated is given by Table 10. One of the trends is the shift away
from forestry and fishing, responsible for almost 20 per cent of exports in
the first decade, already down from 27 per cent in 1770, but for less than 7
per cent before the Civil War.
There was some rise in the importance of manufacturing as a source of
U.S. exports before the Civil War, but American exports were dominated
throughout the period by agriculture. A more surprising fact is that despite
the rise of manufacturing industry in the United States, discussed below,
agricultural products were over 70 per cent of total U.S. exports throughout
the 19th century and a majority of exports up to World War I.Table 10








1770 69.5 4.8 32.0 27.3 0 12.415.8 .2 2.3k
1803-10 75.3 8.2 25.4 13.0 24.4 12.46.6 4.7 1.0
1811-20 83.2 4.4 35.4 10.9 31.6 9.12.8 3.5 1.4
1821-30 79.4 5.0 18.0 10.6 47.6 7.83.0 8.0 1.8
1831-40 81.4 3.4 10.2 8.3 58.0 5.82.9 8.6 1.3
1841-50 80.4 6.9 16.1 7.4 49.8 5.42.8 9.3 2.0
1851-60 80.4 NA NA 6.1 53.2 5.01.512.1
1869-78 81.5131b 166C 49 40.2 4.0NA 15.8
1879-88 78.014.1 30.9 2.7 28.9 3.4NA 13.7
1889-98 72.516.8 27.6 2.5 24.6 3.9NA 16.2
1899-1908 59.714.4 20.0 2.0 23.2 4.8NA 23.3
1904-13 52.911.5 14.4 2.0 25.5 5.3NA 27.3
5NAinly products of mines
bMeats and meat products only. The corresponding figure for 1879-88 is 10.0 per
cent.
cWheat and wheat flour only. Th. corresponding figure for 1879-1888 is 20.6
percent
Sources: 1770: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series Z 294. Data refer to
British Continental Colonies.
1803-1850: U.S. Congress. House of Representatives (1884), Table 2.
1851-1860: U.S. Treasury Department (1860), Table 25, p. 401.
1869-1913: Lipsey (1963), Tables A-6, A-7, B-S. and C-S. Meats are
Intermediate Class 106; animal products, 107 plus 114; vegetable
foods. 104 plus 113 minus107.Tobacco is minor class 025.
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Vol. II, Series U 274-294.
Meats and meat products ar, series U 285; wheat and wheat flour
is series U 281, products of the forest an, series U 286,
U 288, and U 289.
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Within agriculture, the first half of the century saw the decline of
tobacco, the great colonial staple, and its replacement by cotton, which alone
accounted for half or more of exports from the 1830s to the beginning of the
Civil War. Cotton remained important for the rest of the century, and in the
years up to World War I, was still around a quarter of the value of all
exports.
A different view of changes in the composition of trade is provided by
broad economic classes of goods. Before the Civil War, the United States was
mainly an exporter of raw materials and foods. Raw materials alone were 60
per cent or more of exports, food exports were about 20-25 per cent, and semi-
manufactures and finished manufactures accounted for the rest, with the
finished goods rising in importance and the semi-manufactures declining
(Table 11).
The period after the Civil War saw very different trends. The share of
raw materials fell to around 30 per cent and food exports increased to replace
them, reaching a peak importance of over 40-45 per cent in the last two
decades of the 19th century and then declining to about a quarter just before
World War I. Thus raw materials and foods together remained overwhelmingly
predominant in exports almost until the eve of World War I, at 80 per cent or
close to it through the 1880s, and three quarters of the total through 1908.
The changing comparative advantage of the United States can be described
by a comparison of the role of resource products in exports as compared with
imports. By Vanek's (1963) definition of resource products (crude materials
and crude foods) the share of these products in exports fell from four times
that in imports to less than that in imports between 1820 and 1904-13, with
the sharpest drop coming between the beginning and end of the Civil War. By aTable 11









1820 100.0 59.6 3.8 19.2 9.6 5.8
1830 100.0 62.7 5.1 16.9 6.8 8.5
1840 100.0 67.9 4.5 14.3 4.5 9.8
1850 100.0 62.2 5.9 14.8 4.4 12.6
1850-1858 100.0 60.3 7.0 16.1 4.1 12.6
1859-1868 100.0 41.3 14.0 23.8 5.3 15.7
1869-1878 100.0 44.1 15.2 20.0 4.7 15.9
1879-1888 100.0 34.2 20.9 25.0 4.8 15.1
1889-1898 100.0 32.9 17.1 25.9 7.0 17.1
1899.1908 100.0 29.2 12.7 21.7 11.9 24.6









1821 100.0 5.5 10.9 20.0 7.3 56.4
1830 100.0 7.9 11.1 15.9 7.9 57.1
1840 100.0 12.2 15.3 15.3 11.2 44.9
1850 100.0 7.5 10.3 12.1' 14.9 54.6
1850-1858 100.0 8.7 11.2 14.4 13.2 52.5
1859.1868 100.0 13.0 13.9 17.7 13.1 42.3
1869-1878 100.0 15.7 15.5 21.4 12.8 34.6
1879-1888 100.0 20.6 15.4 18.5 14.5 30.9
1889-1898 100.0 24.7 17.7 17.0 13.9 26.7
1899-1908 100.0 33.0 12.4 13.0 16.6 25.0
1904.1913 100.0 34.6 11.9 11.8 17.7 26.1
Sourc.: U.S. Sureau of the Census (1975), Vol.11, Pp. 889-890.
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broader definition of resource products that includes manufactured foods such
as flour and mat, the decline in the resource share was only about half as
large and the Civil War played less of a role. Since the value added in
manufacturing is relatively small in these industries the broader definition
seems more appropriate. Nevertheless, the shift away from U.S. comparative
advantage in resource products is very substantial, from an export share over
twice the share in imports to virtual equality.
All this is not to say that manufactured goods other than foods played
no role in exports. The share of finished manufactures started very low: a
little over 5 per cent in 1820 and still less than 10 per cent in 1840, but
reached over a quarter in the first two periods of the twentieth century, over
40 per cent for finished manufactures and semimanufactures together. Their
steady growth in importance was interrupted in the period from the Civil War
through the l880s as crude food exports pushed them aside for a time. As a
result, the share of finished manufactures in U.S. exports in the 1880s and
l890s (15 and 17 per cent) was not very high compared to that of "third world"
countries around 1900, about 11 per cent according to Bairoch and Etemad
(1985, Table 2.1), if we remove nonferrous metals from their manufactured
category for comparability.
On the import side, the United States began its existence as an importer
of finished manufactures, more than half the total at first. As these
products grew in importance among exports, they declined among imports. By
the beginning of the 20th century the United States was no longer a net
importer of finished manufactures from the rest of the world. The
manufactures share in exports grew from a tenth of that in imports in 1820-21
to more than the share in imports by 1904-13.26
The Irtdustrv Distribution of Trade Relative to OutoutandEmDloyment
The share of agriculture in American exports throughout the 19th century
did not reflect thetransformationthat was taking place more generally in the
American economy. In the economy as a whole, agriculture was shrinking in
importance throughout the 19th century. The share of agricultural output in
conventionally defined CDP fell from almost half in 1800 to a third in 1860
(Weiss, 1993). If farm improvement is included in agricultural output and it
and home manufacturing are included in CDP the decline appears more gradual
and concentrated in the period from 1840 to 1860. The general story of the
period, strongly influenced by the assumptions made in calculating GDP, is
that agriculture was already much more dependent on exports than other sectors
of the U.S. economy and that this dependence, as measured by the ratio of
exports to output, increased substantially up to the beginning of the Civil
War.
After the Civil War, farm gross product in current prices fell from
forty per cent or so of CNP in 1869 to twenty per cent in 1900 and only a
little over fifteen per cent in 1913, when the agricultural share in American
exports was still over half.
Estimates of the industrial distribution of the U.S. labor force also
show the shift out of agriculture, particularly after 1810 or 1820. The
contrast between the stability of agriculture's share in exports and the
decline in agriculture's share of the labor force is not quite as Strong in
Weiss' (1992) estimates -theagricultural share fell from 74 per cent in 1800
to 56 per cent in 1860as in those of Lebergott (1966) and David (1967) -83
per cent to 53 per cent over the same period. All tell a similar story,
however, of a large rise in the ratio of exports per worker in agriculture27
relative to other sectors. Agriculture's share of the labor force continued
to fall in the second half of the century, from a little over half at the
beginning of the Civil War, to forty per cent in 1900 and a little over thirty
per cent by 1910, according to Lebergott (1966). Rapid as the decline in the
agricultural share of the U.S. labor force was from before the Civil War to
the beginning of World War I, the fall was even steeper in some other
countries. For example, in Great Eritain, the largest market by far for U.S.
exports, the share of the labor force in agriculture, forestry, and fishing
fell by more than half between 1861 and 1911 (Mitchell, 1978, p. 61), and the
share of agriculture alone fell by 60 per cent from 1841 to 1901, after a
decline of a third in the previous forty years (Kuznets, 1966, Table 3.2).
The combination of the falling importance of agriculture in production
and the labor force with its stubbornly high share in exports meant that
American agriculture was becoming increasingly dependent on exporting.
Agricultural exports were about a tenth of agricultural gross income in the
early 1800s, reached more than a fifth and at times almost a quarter in the
late 19th century, and were still close to a fifth through the beginning of
World War I (Table 12).
Thus the export dependence (exports/output) of the agricultural sector,
always high relative to that of the country as a whole, went from being twice
as high in the early 19th century to three and a half times as high during the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
The United States retained much of its comparative advantage in
agricultural products far into the period of industrialization and far into
the era when the United States was becoming a major industrial power. One
reason for this was that, in contrast to European countries, the United StatesTable 12
Export Dependence (Exports/Output) of the U.S. and U.S. Agriculture
Source: 1810-1860: Table 3 and sources cited in Tables 3 and 10.
28
1869-1913:Lipsey, 1972. Tables 14.1 and 14.2. All these ratios are
overstated because the denominators are gross product
originating, net of purchases of inputs from other
industries, but the numerators are export values with no




Agricultural Relative to U.S.
Total
1810 9.8 4.9 2.0
1820 14.2 6.3 2.3
1830 10.6 5.3 2.0
1840 12.3 5.9 2.1
1850 14.7 5.8 2.5
1860 15.3 6.3 2.4
1869-78 18 6.2 2.9
1879-88 21 6.7 3.1
1889-98 24 6.9 3.5
1899-1908 22 6.7 3.3
1904-13 19 6.3 3.029
was increasing its land area even as its population, labor force, and capital
stock were growing. Between 1790 and 1850, the end of the period of growth in
area, the land area of the United States more than tripled. The population
grew more than twice as fast, but the enormous increase in acreage kept the
land/population ratio to less than a doubling. Over some periods, such as
1800 to 1810 or 1820, or 1840 to 1850, the ratio declined (U.S. Bureau of the
Census, 1975, Series A-i to A-5). From 1800 to 1850 the population/land ratio
in the U.S. rose less than that of Europe and Asiatic Russia, despite the far
more rapid population growth rate in the United States.
Despite the declining importance of agriculture, the second half of the
nineteenth century represented a climax in the development of American
agriculture and the agricultural export trade. Farm productivity and output
per capita grew more rapidly in the second half of the century than in the
first half and the per capita output of agricultural products reached levels
never again attained in later years.
This rapid growth of farm output involved large expansions in the
farming area of the United States, even after the land area of the United
States itself stopped growing; the land added to farms in the 50 years after
1850 was almost twice the 1850 average. Many of the great increases in farm
production were associated with the migration of production to new areas. In
the first half of the century, cotton production migrated from Georgia and
South Carolina to Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas. After 1850 the
main shift was the migration of grain and meat production from the Atlantic
states and the Ohio Valley to the states vest of the Mississippi.
These additions to farm acreage involved increases in the U.S. supply of
agricultural products. At the same time, the supply of North American30
agricultural products, as seen from Europe, was increased further by a rapid
decline in freight rates both within the United States and on shipments across
the Atlantic.
Rapidly increasing U.S. production and falling prices, combined with the
decline of transport costs, enabled American products to drive continental
suppliers out of the British market for grains and meat during the years after
the Civil War. Eventually the same transport-cost developments, as well as
increases in U.S. domestic demand and the development of still newer producing
areas such as Canada, Australia, and Argentina brought about the dethronement
of the United States as the major supplier of agricultural products to Europe.
One of the countries that felt the impact of U.S. grain exports was
Sweden. As Swedish grain exports declined in the face of American
competition, many Swedish farmers gave up their less productive Swedish land
resources and moved to the United States, especially to Minnesota and
Illinois. There they combined their human capital acquired in Sweden, their
farming skills, with the more productive American land and climate, and thus
added to the U.S. grain supply still further (Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Ohisson).
The significance of the foreign market was greatest during periods of
rapid expansions in agricultural output. For example, although post-Civil War
agricultural exports ranged between 20 and 25 percent of output, the increase
in agricultural exports was about one third of the increase in output from
1870-1874 to the peak in 1895-1899. Exports absorbed large proportions of
increases in agricultural output when agricultural output was growing most
rapidly. They sustained agricultural prices, which might otherwise have
dropped sharply, given the relatively low domestic elasticity of demand for
most agricultural products. In that way, exports encouraged the flow of31
resources (both land and settlers) into new agricultural production. The flow
might otherwise have been cut off at an earlier point if large price declines
had made new settlement unattractive.
The histories of individual commodities contain illustrations of two
somewhat different roles for export markets. One is to supply the initial
impetus for the settlement of new lands and for production of a commodity.
The other is to provide a wider market and a higher demand elasticity, and in
some cases a more efficient scale of production, for goods that are initially
made for local, or domestic, markets. Several products fall into the first of
the categories mentioned -- thoseinitially oriented toward the export market
and always mainly dependent on it. Tobacco, for example, was produced largely
for export from an early stage in its development. Over two thirds of the
crop was exported in 1800 and about three quarters in 1810. Cotton was the
epitome of an export crop. 80 percent of the output was exported in the
1830s, when it first reached major importance. Even in the second half of the
nineteenth century, when cotton and tobacco had long since declined in
significance as parts of American agriculture, the proportion of the crops
exported remained over 50 percent.
Important as cotton and tobacco were, they accounted for only about a
sixth of agricultural output in 1860, and were responsible for less than a
fifth of the growth of agricultural exports between 1860 and 1890, although
they had provided more than 80 percent of the growth in U.S. agricultural
exports between 1800 and 1860. Many of the other agricultural products --
eventhose that were export items -- fellinto the second class described
above. They began as essentially domestic products but became export goods as
American production developed and became more efficient and as transportation32
costs fell. The export market was not the main impetus in theearlystages of
development. The course of the trade/output ratios of some of these other
products, such as grains, was very different from those of cotton and tobacco.
At no time did the grain export ratio reach 50 percent -- domesticconsumption
was always the main destination of grain output. However, the export market
did, at times, take a large fraction of increases in the output of grains; in
the case of wheat, for example, almost 50 percent of the increase in output
from 1869-1873 to 1894-1898 went into exports.
For some products, the export/output ratios are deceptive, because the
output is sold to another domestic industry and processed before exporting.
Exports of live animals were almost always a small fraction of farm output,
but the export of meat products accounted for considerable proportions of the
farm sales. In the case of pork products, for example, the rise in exports
was at times over 50 percent of the addition to farm income from hogs,
although exports never accounted for a high proportion of any year's output.
Exports of the animals themselves were negligible.
Thus the situation for grains and meat products differed from that of
cotton and tobacco, to judge from the lower export/output ratios and the wider
fluctuations in these ratios. There was, probably, a steady increase in
domestic demand with the growth of population and urbanization. Domestic
demand was, however, inelastic. That is, a decline in price would not
have produced a great increase in domestic food consumption; an increase in
output, all thrown on the domestic market, would have caused severe price
declines. Foreign demand, at least in markets in which there were other
suppliers to replace, was much more elastic. The United States could increase
its sales abroad by replacing other foreign suppliers and the American33
agricultural sector did not have to rely on raising the domestic consumption
of foods by lowering prices.
Changes in supply were irregular, as in the case of cotton, and also
involved large population movements to new farming areas. These population
movements were, however, partly autonomous --thatis, they were not simply a
response to rising prices. If there had been no foreign market, but only the
domestic market with its inelastic demand, a period of rising supply from new
land settlement, if it would have taken place, would have brought severe price
declines. Thus, the existence of the foreign markets and their openness to
U.S. exports may have been an essential pre-condition for rapid agricultural
expansion.
Aside from agriculture, primary industries that were important in
exports at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and even more in the
eighteenth century, were forestry and fisheries. Both were declining as
export industries during the first half of the nineteenth century, and the
fisheries had already declined considerably in the final years of the
eighteenth. Products of the sea fell from 16 percent of exports in 1770 to 7
percent in 1803-1810 and 2 percent in 1851-1860; and forest products, which
accounted for 12 percent of the value of exports in 1770 and 1803-1810,
declined to 5 percent in 1851-1860.
The export/output ratio for forestry was probably above 15 percent in
the early 1800s. In the case of fishing, exports in the 10 or 15 years before
the Civil War appeared to be well over a quarter of the total value of output,
and the ratio must have been higher in earlier years. It might well have been
a third or more, especially for the whale fisheries, in the 1770s. The
importance of export markets thus seems to have been great in a wide range of34
primary products, including those derived from forestry and fishing as well as
farming.
Even in 1869, before the peak in farm exports, the export ratio for
agriculture was more than twice as great as the ratio for manufacturing. The
few manufactured products that were exported reflected the richness of
American resources, rather than American capabilities in processing them. The
export ratio was inflated by the figure for food products, mainly grain and
meat products, in which a high fraction of the value entering the final cost,
over 80 percent, had been added in agriculture rather than in manufacturing.
The petroleum and coal products group, also highly dependent on a
resource base, was the only manufacturing industry in which exports played a
large role in the early stages of development. Exports accounted for more
than half of output in 1869 and 1879, and the share remained above one quarter
through 1914. In no other manufacturing industry, even those such as foods
which were close to the primary production stage, did the ratios ever go above
15 percent. In 1869, 14 out of 18 manufacturing industries showed export
ratios below 4 percent, and 10 out of 18 ratios were below 2 percent.
The dominance of export trade as a factor in U.S. growth was confined to
agriculture and other primary industries. Within agriculture, exports played
a major role in two different ways. In some products, particularly in the
early decades, the foreign market was the main outlet and the main stimulus to
the flow of resources and the growth of production. In others, especially in
the second half of the nineteenth century, the foreign market eased the path
of rapid growth in output by cushioning the effect of increased supply on
price, an effect which we might expect to have been large in view of the
presumably low price elasticities of domestic demand for agricultural35
products.
Another indicator of the trend in American comparative advantage is
provided by sectoral export/output ratios, available only from 1869 on.
While the trends are not very strong, they do differ in direction. The export
ratio in agriculture reached a peak in 1879 and then mainly declined (Table
13). The ratio in resource-oriented manufacturing also reached its peak in
1879, while for other manufactured goods, the export ratio showed an upward
trend, if any.
Table 13
Export/Output Ratios (Per Cent)
For Agriculture and Manufacturing
11122 1 12 12
Agriculture 9.8 18.3 13.2 13.2 11.0 10.5
Resource -oriented
Manufacturinga 8.2 12.1 9.8 11.3 9.4 7.3
Other Manufacturing 1.6 3.3 1.9 4.3 4.6 4.2
aFood products, Tobacco products, Petroleum and coal products, and Forest
products.
Source: Unpublished compilations by Phyllis A. Wallace. See National Bureau
of Economic Research, Thirty-third Annual Retort, 1953 (New York,
NBER, 1953). These ratios are lower than those of Table 12 because
no deductions have been made here in the denominators for the
purchase of inputs from other industries.
Thus, in both agriculture and resource-oriented manufacturing industries, for
which export trade was relatively important -overten per cent of production
at times -theimportance of export markets was declining. Resources were
becoming less of a basis for American exports. In other manufacturing
industries, on the other hand, for which the resource base was less important,36
exports rose as a per cent of production. That was particularly notable in
metal products, machinery, and transport equipment (Table 14).
Table 14
Export/Output Ratios for Selected Manufacturing Industries, 1869 and 1909
(Per Cent)
1869 1909
Iron and steel products 1.7 4.2
Nonferrous metal products 1.7 9.3
Machinery 3.2 7.7
Transportation equipment .8 3.2
Source: Same as Table 13
On the import side, the opposite changes were taking place. The shares
of imports in domestic consumption were declining sharply for manufacturing as
a whole and for almost every manufacturing group, the main exception being
forest products (Table 15).
Table 15







Textile products 20.8 8.6
Chemical products 26.8 11.8
Forest products 3.6 3.6
Iron & steel products 12.0 1.4
Nonferrous metal products 20.1 9.2
Source: Same as Table 1337
The import share of goods consumed generally increased for the resource
industries, agriculture, fishing, and mining. In manufacturing, imports
provided sharply decreasing shares of most products. Thus the import data
give clear indications of the shift in American comparative advantage toward
manufacturing and away from natural resource products.
The Commodity Composition of tJ.S. Trade in Relation to World Trade
The changes in U.S. comparative advantage after the Civil War can be
illustrated by the comparison of the composition of U.S. exports with that of
world exports. The U.S. share of world exports of primary products fluctuated
over a fairly narrow range from the l870s through the first years of the
twentieth century and only fell somewhat in the decade or so before World War
I (Table 16). The U.S. share of world manufactured exports remained at about
4 per cent through the 1880s and then rose rapidly. Thus the shift in
comparative advantage on the export side took place only at the end of the
century despite the large shifts in U.S. production and employment mentioned
above.
Another way of seeing this change is by comparing the composition of
U.S. exports with that of world exports. The world ratio of manufactured
product to primary product exports was quite stable at around sixty percent
from the late 1870s through 1913. The U.S. ratio was far lower, reflecting
the U.S.comparative advantage as a primary product exporter, remaining at
about sixteen to eighteen per cent from the l870s through the early l890s.
Then, in the next twenty years, it rose to forty per cent, as the shift in
production and employment from primary products to manufacturing finally began
to be reflected in the composition of U.S. exports.Table 16
U.S. and World Exports of Primary Products and Manufactures
U.S. Exports as
Per Cent of World
Exports
Manufactures
Exports as Per Cent of
Primary Exvorts
Primary
Products Manufactures World U.S.
1871-75 NA NA NA 16.8
1876-80 15.4 4.0 61.6 16.1
1881-85 16.0 4.2 62.5 16.2
1886-90 14.4 4.1 63.4 18.0
1891-95 16.1 4.7 58.5 17.0
1896-1900 16.7 7.0 59.2 24.7
1901-05 16.0 8.0 57.7 28.9
1906-10 14.7 8.2 60.5 33.7
1911-13 13.8 9.2 60.7 40.5
Source: League of Nations (1945), Tables VII, VIII, IX, and XIII.
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THE DIRECTION OF U.S. TRADE
Changes in theDestinationof Exvorts and the Origin of Imoorts
American exports were directed mainly to Europe from the country's
earliest days, and almost all that did not go to Europe were shipped to
European colonies in the West Indies (Table 17). Since much of the trade
pattern in these years reflected the effects of the Napoleonic Wars and the
British blockade of Europe, some of the West Indies trade may have been
disguised trade with Europe or a temporary substitute for European trade.
The concentration of American exports on Europe increased over most of
the 19th century, despite the growth of the industrial economy of the U.S.
That growth was presumably giving the United States the capability of being
more of a competitor to Europe in manufacturing, and less of a supplier of raw
materials and foods, but the increasing focus on Europe as a market lasted
through the l880s, and was only sharply reversed after the l89Os. The same
was true for the role of the U.K., which grew as a destination of U.S. exports
from less than a quarter at the beginning of the 18th century. despite the
ties of language and tradition, to over half in the l870s and 1880s before
falling back rather steeply after 1900. Some of the former UK share went to
Germanyinthe late 19th century and some of it went to the Western
Hemisphere, as U.S. exports began shifting to less developed areas of the
world.
Europe was about as important as a source of imports as it was as a
destination for exports in the early decades of the 19th century (Table 18).
However, for imports the trend in the European share was steadily downward,
from two thirds or so to about half before World War I. The decline in the
British share, and also intheFrench share, was steeper, while the German40
Table 17
Distribution of U.S. Exports (Including Re-Exports), by Destination
1790-1913
Europe Axnerica
Total Total UK Germany Total Canada
Per Cent
1790-98 100 62 21 16 38' NA
1799-1808 100 62 22 8 38' NA
1809-18 100 69 28 3 31' NA
1819-28 100 64 34 3C
1829-38 100 71 43 - 27 3
1839-48 100 73 47 - 24 5
1849-58 100 73 48 - 23 8
1860 100 75 51 4 21 7
1869-78 100 81 54 9 17 6
1879-88 100 81 52 8 14 5
1889-98 100 79 48 11 16 6
1899-1908 100 72 36 14 19 8
1904-1913 100 66 30 14 25 12
-— lessthan 0.5 per cent.
'Total minus Europe
bTotal minus Europe, 36 per cent, Asia, 2 per cent.
Cl82l28
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U 317-334. According
to Pitkin (1816), pp. 215-217, almost all the exports to •/erica' in 1795-
1802 (36 per cent of the total, excluding exports to 'Florida and Louisiana')
were to the West Indies.Table 18





1795-1801 100 52 35 2 5 38a 0 NA NA 9
1821-28 100 63 40 10 3 26 <1 9 2 11
1829-38 100 64 37 15 3 22 1 8 4 8
1839-48 100 67 38 19 3 25 1 8 5 8
1849-58 100 66 42 14 5 26 4 8 6 7
1860 100 61 39 12 5 29 7 9 6 8
1869-78 100 54 33 9 7 35 6 13 7 10
1879-88 100 55 26 11 9 32 6 9 7 11
1889-98 100 52 21 9 12 33 5 7 10 11
1899-1908 100 51 17 9 11 30 5 6 7 16
1904-1913 100 50 17 8 11 32 6 7 7 15
a0f which1 from "Florida and Louisiana" and 37 from theWest Indies.
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U335-352 and Pitkin (1816), pp. 212-214.
4142
share of U.S. imports doubled. The other areas increasing in importance as
sources of imports were Canada and Asia.
The underlying causes of these shifts were changes in foreign supply and
demand, arising from the growth of population and production in other
countries, and changes in American supply and demand arising from U.S. growth
and the changing structure of production.
The share of American exports going to Europe was not very different
from the share of Europe's own exports other than to North America, going to
Europe (intra-European trade) during much of the 19th century, despite the
extra cost of ocean transport for shipping goods from the U.S. (Table 19).
Table 19
Share of Europe as a Destination for Exports to or Origin of Imports From
Europe U.S.
ExportsImports Exports Imports
to from to from
(except to and from
North America)
1800 84 NA 58 NA
1830 82 70 67 63
1840 76 NA 74 63
1850 77 72 76 71
1860 74 71 75 61
1870 78 76 81 55
1880 79 77 86 56
1890 76 76 80 57
1900 76 74 75 52
1910 73 70 65 52
Source: Bairoch (1976a), Tables 21 and 22, and U.S.
Bureau of the Census (1975), Series U317, U324, 13335 and U342
The similarity in export destinations, despite the differences in the stage of
development between Europe and the U.S., suggests that these shares were
determined mainly by the weight of Europe as a market.43
On the import side, the story was different; Europe remained the source
of close to three quarters of Europe's imports other than those from North
America throughout the century, but Europe declined as a source of U.S.
imports after the mid-century. Either the weight of Europe as a producer was
falling or U.S. demand was shifting away from the mix of products suited to
Europe's comparative advantage as American manufacturing industries developed
and their products supplanted imported manufactures in the U.S. market. The
stability of Europe's share of U.S. exports, at least until the 1890s or
later, is linked to the stability of agriculture's share of U.S. exports, up
to the 1880s or 1990s. Both reflect the decline of European agriculture and
the continued American comparative advantage in agricultural products. The
decline in Europe's share of U.S. imports is linked with the falling share of
finished manufactures in U.S. imports, discussed earlier.
One way to judge the closeness of trade relations is to take account of
the sizes of destination countries, by population, for example. Canada, which
never accounted for a noticeable share of total U.S. exports, can be seen from
the U.S. exports per capita to be much more closely tied to the U.S. by trade
than many larger countries (Table 20). By this criterion of trade
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"intensity", both income per capita in the importing country and a common
language appears to be important positive influences, to judge by the high
trade intensity with distant Australia and the intensity of trade with the UK
relative to Germany and France.
On the import side, the intensity of trade, as measured now by U.S.
imports per capita of origin country population, with U.K. —100,was
especially high with Canada, to a much greater degree than for export (Table
21)
Table 21
U.S. Imports Relative to Population in
Exporting Countries
12Q 11Q
Canada NA 186 230
UK 100 100 100
Australia NA 24 51
Germany 5 21 67
France 11 22 47
Mexico NA 6 75
Brazil NA 49 73
Japan NA 2 26
China 1 1 1
Mexico, Brazil, and Germany all exported more to the U.S. per person in the
source country than did Australia, despite the common language. Propinquity,
for Mexico and Canada, and the nature of each country's comparative advantage
seemed to be more important in determining the sources of imports than were
language or per capita income.45
TRENDSIN THE U. S. TERMS OF TRADE
Aggregate National Terms of Trade
Theratio of export to import prices, or termsof trade of a country
(sometimesreferred to as the "net barter terms of trade") measures changes in
the purchasing power of exports: the quantity of imports purchased by each
unit of export production. A rise in the terms of trade is often viewed as a
favorable development for a country, and referred to as an "improvement" in
the terms of trade, although that interpretation is questionable at times. If
a rise is the consequence of increasing demands for the country's export
products, the effect on real income is favorable. However, if it is the
consequence of a rise in costs relative to other countries, it is an
unfavorable development, representing a decline in the country's ability to
compete in international markets. That is true whether the rise in costs is
the result of inflation or of productivity growth that is slower than in other
countries.
Itis widely believed that countries depending on primary products for
export revenue tend to suffer declining terms of trade in the long run.
Several reasons have been suggested as to why such a decline is to be
expected. One is that price elasticities of demand for agricultural products
are low. Increases in world production are not easily absorbed by gains in
consumption and therefore result in relatively large price declines.
Furthermore, income elasticities of demand for food are low; a rise in income
leads to a less than proportional rise in food consumption. Food prices
therefore are not lifted by increases in world income. In addition, it is
said that agricultural products are sold in competitive markets and there is
little opportunity for producers to exercise monopoly power to raise prices.46
In contrast, manufactured products are said to be subject to higher demand and
income elasticities and to the raising of their prices through monopolistic
market practices.
Data on the terms of trade of the United States span a period of over
100 years, covering the metamorphosis from a primitive economy exporting
almost entirely primary products to an industrial power with one of the
worlds highest income levels. On the whole, the picture is one of long-term
improvement in the terms of trade -- perhapsan increase of two-thirds from
the founding of the country to World War I (Table 22). The greatest gains
took place before the Civil War, when the United States was almost entirely an
Table 22
Terms of Trade of the United States' (1913—100)















aExport price index +importprice index.
Source: Lipsey (1972). Table 14.3
exporter of primary -- largelyagricultural -- products.These remained
predominant through the end of the nineteenth century, as a gradual rise in
the terms of trade continued. After the l880s, the terms of trade improved47
little, if at all. Within the nineteenth century history of the United
States, therefore, there is no evidence that being an agricultural exporter
led to an unfavorable evolution of the net barter terms of trade.
Sectoral Price Trends
Classical economic thought contained strong predictions about the long-
term trends of the relative prices of agricultural and other primary products
relative to manufactured goods. The classical view, starting at least as far
back as Robert Torrens, continued by John Stuart Mill, and reinforced by
Jevons' alarm at the exhaustion of British coal resources, was that a...the
exchange value of manufactured articles, compared with the products of
agriculture and of mines, have, as population and industry advance, a certain
and decided tendency to fall."1 The opposite view was suggested from a
reading of the factual record by Hilgerdt in a 1945 League of Nations report
and was later promoted in a series of United Nations documents and articles,
particularly by Raoul Prebisch and Hans Singer. That view was that primary
goods prices had been declining secularly, and attributed the decline to low
price and income elasticities for food, declining demand arising from the
replacement of natural raw materials by synthetic materials, and monopolistic
or oligopolistic pricing practices of manufacturing firms in developed
countries that prevented buyers of manufactured exports from reaping the gains
from productivity improvements in manufacturing.
The United States in the 19th century was a good laboratory in which to
1John Stuart Mill, Princi1es of Political Economy, New York, 1909, Vol.
II, Book IV, Chapter 2, p. 28248
test these theories because the record of the aggregate terms of trade goes
back to the period when agriculture was predominant and extends through the
transformation to an industrial economy, and the record of agricultural and
manufacturing prices and productivity also reaches to earlier stages of
development than for most other countries.
Within U.S. exports, the price index for agricultural products,
dominated by exports of cotton, was so volatile that it is hard to see a
trend, but there were clearly large declines in prices of both agricultural
and manufactured products between 1815-20 and 1830 or the 1830s as a whole.
Since the export prices of manufactures did not fall as fast as agricultural
export prices, the relative export prices of manufactures increased (Table
23). From the 1830s to the 1850s changes in relative prices were fairly
small, not surprisingly in view of the fact that cotton and tobacco were very
heavily weighted in the agricultural export price and cotton and tobacco
manufactures accounted for 70 to 80 per cent of the weight in the manufactured
goods price index. After 1879, there was a considerable decline in the price
of manufactured exports relative to prices of agricultural exports, a movement
that accorded with the classical expectations and contradicted the Prebisch-
Singer view.
The basis for the classical belief that manufactured goods prices would
fall in the long run was the conviction that productivity would grow more
rapidly in manufacturing than in agriculture. That part of the prediction
seems to have been correct, both before and after the Civil War. From 1879 to
the beginning of World War I, manufacturing productivity rose more rapidly
than agricultural productivity, and manufactured goods export prices fell
relative to agricultural export prices (Table 23). The relative productivity49
Table 23
Relation Between U.S. Manufactured and Agricultural Product Export Prices
and Total Factor Productivity
1815-1860, 1879-1913
Export Price Indexes Productivity















Sources:1879-1913: Lipsey (1972), p. 575. 1815-1860: Price indexes from
North (1961); Real value added from Galiman (1960), p. 43; Labor
force from Lebergott (1964), p. 510; Price indexes are for
individual years and decade averages; value added is for 1839, 1849,
and 1859 and averages of 1839, 1844 and 1849 and for 1849, 1854 and
1859; labor force is for 1840, 1850, and 1860, and averages of first
and last years of decade.50
change accounted for about sixty per cent of therelative export price change.
In the twenty years before the Civil War, a similar relative growth in
manufacturing productivity did not have any counterpart in export price
developments; the export price ratio for manufactured goods rlative to
agricultural products was quite stable. In the earlier period also,from
1815-20 to 1839-40 there was little change in the export price ratio. In this
earlier period too, a comparison of Sokoloff's (1986) productivity measures
for selected manufacturing industries with the Towne and Rasmussen (1960)
productivity measures for agriculture suggests that manufacturing productivity
was growing much faster than agricultural productivity.
There are several possible reasons why the productivity and price ratios
do not match before 1860. After 1830, North's (1961 Appendix II, Table IV)
export price index is dominated by cotton manufactures and to amuch smaller
extent, tobacco manufactures, both of which enjoyed productivity growth more
rapid than that in agriculture (tobacco manufactures only after 1850,
according to Sokoloff). However, both industries' outputs included large
elements of agricultural input and that may explain why North's manufactures
price index rises by an amount identical to that of the raw material price
index, dominated by cotton and tobacco.
Before 1830, the products in North's manufactures price index do not
match Sokoloff's list well, the largest item in the price index being soap,
not included by Sokoloff, and the second being tobacco manufactures, which not
only include a large agricultural input content but also did not enjoy rapid
productivity gains before 1850.
The price and productivity movements of the post-Civil War period reveal
the changes in the rewards to the factors of production in the two sectors.51
Just as the agricultural export price indicates the money return per unit of
agricultural commodities sold, the ratio of the agricultural to the
manufacturing price is one measure of the purchasing power of these
agricultural commodities, assuming that manufactured exports are
representative of U.S. manufacturing production in general. The product of
the relative price and the agricultural productivity index indicates the
course of returns to factors of production, or inputs, in agriculture: the
purchasing power over manufactures of an hour of agricultural labor or a unit
of capital employed in agriculture.
Agricultural factors of production did very well indeed after the 1890s,
by this measure (Table 24). Productivity in manufacturing increased much
faster than in agriculture. Agricultural export prices rose rapidly, much
faster than prices of manufactured goods. The purchasing power of
agricultural factors over manufactured goods grew at a fast pace while the
purchasing power of manufacturing factors of production over agricultural
products actually fell. The gains from growing productivity in manufacturing
went largely to agricultural factors of production and, of course to foreign
purchasers of U.S. manufacturing exports.
THE EFFECTS OF WARSAND OFTRADEPOLICIES
The Navigation Acts
Most of what we have described here as the development of American trade
in the nineteenth century could be thought of as being outside the realms of
both chance events or conscious policy. We have attributed trade developments
mainly to income levels, productivity changes, factor endowments and changes
in endowments. One possible exception to the unimportance of governmentTable 24
Agricultural and Manufactured Export Price Indexes and

















































1879-88 118.5 142.1 69.1
1889-98 93.1 138.2 78.7
1899-1908 97.0 126.8 86.8
1904-1913 98,2 110.4 90.053
policies is the influence of the Navigation Acts on the trade pattern of the
American colonies, the pattern with which the country began its existence.
The British government in the colonial period was no believer in leaving
trade to the operation of the invisible hand. As Adam Smith described the
exemptions from the Navigation Laws, their purpose was to exploit the
incentives provided by access to foreign markets to encourage the cultivation
of grain, the clearing and use of forests, and the raising of cattle beyond
what would otherwise be feasible in •'...athinly populated country." The key
to the success of the policy was the fact that access to "extensive markets"
would cause the prices of these products to be high, as they would not be in a
country cut off from trade. These high prices would encourage the extension
of cultivation and improvement of the breed of cattle.
The other side of the Navigation Acts, and their main purpose, was to
give home (British) purchasers of some colonial raw materials a monopoly on
the output of the colonies, to keep prices low, and to severely restrict the
growth in the colonies of manufacturing industries that might compete with
British sellers.
The initial pattern of colonial trade fit well with these plans, since
the exports were so largely crude materials and foods and imports were mainly
manufactured products. However, the same pattern could be explained by the
factor proportions and technological backwardness of the colonies. The fact
that the evolution of the pattern of trade after independence was gradual, and
the fact that the United States moved toward greater concentration on trade
with the U.K. after independence, when the earlier restrictions were absent,
suggest that economic forces, rather than the Navigation Acts were the main
determinants of both the commodity and country patterns of U.S. trade.54
A similar conclusion, minimizing the effects of British imperial policy
on the welfare of the colonies and on the nature of their economies was
arrived at by North (1974). He dismissed restrictions on manufacturing as
inconsequential, given the colonies' factor proportions, which did not point
to any comparative advantage in that field. That view was shared by many
contemporary observers. For example, Benjamin Franklin (quoted in Callender
1909, pp. 35 and 36), "...while there is land enough in America for people,
there can never be manufactures of any amount of value.. .the colonies are so
little suited for establishing of manufacture, that they are continually
losing the few branches they accidentally gain. There was a burden placed on
American producers of tobacco, particularly, as measured by the difference
between prices received and those available outside the U.K. And there were
also burdens on consumers in the colonies from the artificially inflated
prices of goods imported from other European countries. However, they were
counterbalanced, to a considerable degree, by the advantages of British
military protection (North, 1974, pp. 54-55).
North's analysis, treating 1785-1793 as the norm representing the
situation without British restrictions, implies that if there were any effects
from the restrictions they were short-lived and did not deflect the United
States from its long-term growth path.
The Napoleonic Wars ad the Trade Embargo
There is no doubt that the Napoleonic Wars and the accompanying trade
embargo before the War of 1812 provided both great opportunities for trade and
shipping, as is described in the earlier quotation from Callender, and also
large negative shocks to the young U.S. economy. It is harder to say whether55
any of the effects were permanent, in the sense that the U.S. gained new
industries that survived successfully after the period, or gained or lost
footholds in world markets.
Most of the analyses of this period have focussed on the immediate
advantages of American neutrality at a time when almost all potential rivals
were swept from the trade scene. North describes the years 1793 through 1807
as "extraordinarily prosperous ones. .. a acharacterization confirmed by
"...nuuierous literary descriptions..." (p. 72). The prosperity came from
shipping earnings (which on net balance grew from $5 -8billion to $38 -40
billion), and from increases in export prices and terms of trade.
Once the embargo on trade began in 1808 and especially with the entry of
the U.S. into the war in 1812, these gains were reversed. Shipping earnings
and exports fell drastically and the terms of trade turned against the United
States. The embargo did have some effect in promoting manufacturing in the
United States, but the path of development did not match American comparative
advantage at the time, according to North, and the artificially induced
industrialization quickly withered under postwar competition. Thus the net
balance of the war period, despite the prosperity of its early stages, does
not seem to have propelled American economic development in any substantial
way.
A later review of even the prosperous part of the Napoleonic War period
by Coldin and Lewis (1980) attempted to deflate the "legendary importance" of
the neutrality period by estimating effects on the rate of growth of per
capita income. The estimated gains, while perhaps not of legendary
dimensions, were substantial --increasesin the annual growth rate of per
capita income of something between 30 and 40 per cent. Although the authors56
refer to these income gains as not dramatic they do suggest that there were
more permanent gains to development -- thegrowth of port cities and inland
towns, additions to shipping tonnage, and the spread of banking and of
commercialization in general.
The Civil War
The Civil War was the bloodiest of American history, was fought entirely
on American Soil, and divided the country on economic lines to a large extent.
Despite these factors, there has always been some belief that the northern
states experienced economic gains from the war. However, North (1966, p. 149)
judged that the war ".. .wasnot a major impetus to accelerated industrial
growth..." and presumably was not a major setback either. The basis for the
statement was that the acceleration of industrial growth and the development
of manufacturing had taken place before the war. Gailman (1972) pointed to
the heavy manpower losses during the war, the decrease in immigration, and the
smallness of the industrial requirements of the military •forces in that
period. What the Civil War did do was to alter the relation between the
northern and southern states, greatly reducing the per capita income level of
the South, and widening the income differential between the South and other
areas. There was also a major shift in the balance of political power that
was relevant to trade policy, since the southern states, more dependent on
exports and more oriented to free trade, lost to the northern states, which
were more import dependent and more favorable to protectionist legislation.
The negative effects of the war on the United States as a whole are
reflected in the earlier description of U.S. shares in world trade, which fell
between 1860 and 1870 in an unusual interruption of the long-term upward57
trend. The net indebtedness of the U.S. tripled between the beginning of the
war and the end.
The distribution of exports did not change in a way that would suggest
that the war violently altered the American industrial structure. The share
of finished manufactures grew, but not to a degree that suggested a major
break in the upward trend. The share of cotton exports declined, but no
faster than it did between the 1830s and 1840s, and less than from the 1870s
to the l880s.
On the whole, the Civil War appears more as an interruption to the
changes in the composition of production and exports that were taking place
than as a spur to them.
Effects of Tariff Policy
The extent to which protectionist legislation promoted manufacturing
industry by restricting foreign competition in the U.S. market has been a
perennial subject for dispute. North (1966) mentions the possibility that the
Tariff Acts of 1816, 1824, and 1828 helped revive some parts of the textile
industry after the 1808 embargo and the War of 1812 severely damaged the
industry, but suggests that by 1830 the industry, having become a net
exporter, had no need for protection. He also suggested that the iron
industry, so regulated by the British Navigation Laws,2wasprotected by the
high transport cost of its products.
The era after the Civil War is sometimes cited as a period in which the
2 While Great Britain encourages in America the manufacture of pig and
bar iron, by exempting them from duties.., she imposes an absolute prohibition
upon the erection of steel furnaces and slit-mills in any of her American
plantations." Smith (1776), Book 4, Chapter 7.58
United States used high tariffs successfully to encourage infant industries
that eventually became giants. In 1869, imports were 14 per cent of the
consumption of manufactured goods, and by 1909 that ratio had fallen to 6 per
cent. In every manufacturing industry in which the import share was 10 per
cent or more in 1869, that share fell to half or less in 1909. The iron and
steel industry was an extreme case, with imports falling from 12 to about 1½
per cent. These declines suggest that some of the rapid growth in U.S.
manufacturing involved import substitution: the replacement of imports by
domestic production. That was obviously the case for shares of the market,
but there were also a couple of examples of import substitution in the
absolute sense, with declines in the amount of imports in an industry.
Two cases of import substitution in this absolute sense stand out in the
nineteenth century, and both involve industries in which protection was
increased. One was the large fall in imports of textiles before the Civil
War. In this case the domestic industry had expanded under the embargo, which
was, in effect, a prohibitive tariff, although it was never put in those
terms. Taussig (1931) concluded that the embargo itself, rather than the
tariffs adopted to preserve the industry, provided the main impetus to growth.
Imports of iron and steel also fell between 1879 and 1899, in a period
when domestic consumption of these products more than doubled. Since the
decline in imports was insignificant relative to the growth of production, it
cannot have been the main impetus to such growth. Most appraisals of the
history of the industry have concluded that, while protection and the decline
of imports may have hastened the growth of some elements of the industry,
particularly tin plate, they were not the major influence in the long run for
the industry as a whole (Taussig, 1931; Teinin, 1964).59
A study of the tariff on pig iron (Baack and Ray, 1974) concluded that
the tariff on that product did raise the level of domestic production. Part
of that effect was through the impact on the quality of imports. Since the
tariff on pig iron was a specific duty, framed in terms of dollars per ton, it
weighed much more heavily on cheap grades of pig iron than on expensive
grades. The result was a decline in imports of low quality pig iron, and
encouragement to domestic production at the low end of the quality scale.
In general, the historical studies of protection have attempted to learn
whether protection was successful, in the sense of encouraging the production
of the protected item. They do not, however answer the more important policy
question as to whether the growth and welfare of the country was enhanced,
rather than only that of the protected industries and the factors of
production employed in them.
TRADE AND U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH
The United States, through much of its history, has been pointed to as a
country for which international trade was unimportant. At least it was a
country that, until recently, considered international trade unimportant, gave
little thought to it in policy making, and in which most branches of economics
were taught as if the country were isolated from the rest of the world. One
reason was the relatively low and, at times declining ratio of U.S. trade to
U.S. output described earlier.
These low ratios have affected the recurrent debate about the importance
of trade for U.S. economic growth, particularly growth in the 19th century. A
relatively modest role for international trade was assigned by Kravis (1972),
partly on the argument that trade was too unimportant, in terms of its share60
of total output, to account for much of the growth in GNP or GNP per capita.
A view of the economy as governed by some type of economy-wide production
function in which inputs of factors of production lead to predictable outputs
of product tends to find little room for any influence of trade. Output
growth is assigned as far as possible to growth in the amounts of inputs or in
their quality, to technological progress, and often to some unexplainable
residual. What is missing from these analyses is the question of why the
inputs of resources grew at the rate they did, and the role played not only by
the actual exports and imports, but also by the broader trading
circumstances -- theexistence of markets and the ability of producers and
traders to have access to them.
The view that assigns a more crucial level to trade, and to the growth
of foreign demand, has been associated with the work of Douglass North on U.S.
economic growth. North described the role of growth in foreign demand for
cotton in leading to the westward expansion of cotton farming and, in its
wake, more general expansions in settlement and cultivation.
A review of these controversies by Jeffrey Williamson shifted the
emphasis to a more general influence of trade: the existence of foreign
demand, rather than its growth, and the likelihood, or almost certainty, that
the price elasticity of demand in foreign markets was higher than that in the
domestic market -- probablymuch higher. That high elasticity meant that
rapid expansions of production, such as from the spread of cultivation to new
areas, could take place without causing drastic reductions in the prices
received by producers. Without the highly elastic demand of the foreign
market, expansions of production would quickly face the effects of the low
domestic demand elasticities, prices would fall quickly, and the expansion61
would be cut off. It is not implied that the elasticity of foreign demand for
a product as a whole was necessarily different from that in the U.S. The
higher foreign elasticity of demand for an American export arose from the fact
that it was, typically, a much smaller element of foreign supply than of
American supply. Therefore the American export could substitute for foreign
exports or local production of the same product. If there were efficiencies
to be gained from concentrating an expansion in production in a short period,
they might well be lost if trade were cut off or reduced.
A corollary of this effect of the international market is that the ratio
of exports to production should increase when production grows most rapidly.
As described earlier, that was the case for cotton production in the United
States, and it was also true of the surges in middle-western grain and meat
production in the second half of the nineteenth century. Thus the
existence of a high-elasticity market, in combination with the factors that
initiated the surges in production, may have been crucial to the westward
expansion of the country.
On a more speculative note, one might consider that the advice now being
given to most developing countries urges policies that are outward- rather
than inward-oriented, and favor neutrality or export promotion over import
substitution. Since many currently developing countries are much smaller than
the U.S. was during the early stages of its industrialization, the trade
orientation may be more necessary than it was for a large, continental,
developing country such as the U.S. already was during most of the century.
On the other hand, an outward-oriented trade policy that encourages trade may
have ramifications for many other aspects of government policy. It may affect
investment, competition, monetary, and fiscal policies. It may affect the62
choice of industries by investors, and the productivity of domestic producers.
These broader influences could go far beyond what is suggested by the amounts
of goods actually traded.63
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